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Hidden Conflicts and Journalistic Norms: The Case of Self-Coverage
Abstract
Because news and entertainment firms are increasingly under the same corporate umbrellas, it is likely
that reporting by journalists on the cultural products and activities of their affiliated companies will rise.
The theme of this study is that the phenomenon of reporting on one's own company is best understood
through perspectives on goal conflict and organizational culture. The article argues the need to modify
contemporary scholarly contentions that news firms expect open conflict between reporters and their
superiors on policy issues. Interviews at two daily newspapers and Time magazine support the
theoretically based proposition that investigation of their own organizations is very much an area where
journalists draw away from confronting key professional conflicts. Centering on phenomena such as
silent bargains and silent routines, the study suggests how conflicts about self-coverage are managed
and how this conflict management is tied to larger dynamics of organizational control.
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Hidden Conflicts and Journalistic
Norms: The Case of Self-coverage
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This study explores h o w activities surrounding newsworkers' coverage o f
their o w n firms relates t o the p h e n o m e n o n o f hidden conflicts in organizations, and it suggests what difference that makes for journalistic output.
Though not n e w , self-cover:ige by news organizations is more likely t o
occur in the future than in earlier clecacles I>eca~ise
o f major transformations within the rnedia system. Several forecasters project that b y t h e end
of the d e c a d e :ihout :i half dozen huge firms. at most, will dominate the
mainstream o f n e w s a n d entertainment in the LJnited States a n d around
the world (Ellirnan, 1000). 1Secause news and entertainment organizations
will increasingly h e u n d e r the s:iiiie corporate umbrella, it seems reason-
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able to suggest that reporting b y journalists on the cultural products and
activities of their affiliated companies will rise.
Some of the tensions have already bubbled into public view. Perhaps
the most visible incident was the controversy over Time magazine's coverage of its parent firm's purchase of Warner Communications in 1989.
ccused Time's editors and writers o f tilting their reporting
of the merger toward the public relations needs of their parent firm
(Bruck, 1990; Cohen, 1992). In trade magazines and academic writings,
the incident stimulated concern about situations in which loyalty to the
parent company faces off against a mandate to report the news impartially. It sparked arguments about the implications of competing business
and editorial values in news organizations (Ciabattari, 1989).
Despite such discussions, little thought has been given to the way this
sort of tension relates to other types of conflicts in news organizations.
N o r has attention been paid to the way in which the increased potential
for covering oneself in the new media environment has actually affected
the activities of newsworkers. The purpose of this article is to provide a
theoretical framework for addressing these issues, supported by exploratory research that involved interviews with journalists at two nationally prominent newspapers and at Time magazine.
The study argues the need t o modify contemporary scholarly contentions that news firms expect to see open conflict on policy issues between reporters and their superiors. The article agrees with contemporary
opinion that organizational argumentation represents the norm rather
than (as writers o f earlier decades contended) the exceptions in news organizations. Yet it departs from contemporary writings in suggesting the
importance of understanding when, why, and how reporters and their superiors pull back from conflict-laden discussions about their work.
The research indicates that investigation o f their own organizations is
very much an area where journalists draw away from confronting key
professional conflicts. When it comes t o self-coverage, organizational
processes typically serve both to obstruct the activity and to mute tensions about that ohstruction. At the same time, the study finds that the
very forces that discourage journalists from investigating their own firms
o r talking about them sometimes d o allow-or, in the case of Time, feel
compelled to allow-certain types o f self-coverage. Centering on phenomena such as silent bargains and silent routines, the study suggests
how conflicts about self-coverage are managed and how this conflict
management is tied to larger dynamics of organizational control.

Tracking Internal Dissension

The existence and nature of conflicts between journalists and their
sources has long been a topic o f much interest in studies of newswork
(Fishman, 1980; Gans, 1979; Lippmann, 1922; Rosten, 1937; Sigal, 1973)
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When it comes to conflicts within news firms, however, the scholarly literature is much less abundant (Schudson, 1792). Nevertheless, it is possible t o note a n important change in scholarly perspectives o n the pervasiveness a n d significance o f internal conflicts.
Before the late 1970s, academics 11y a n d large agreed that journalists
learn their firms’ news policies through a socialization process g e n c ~ a l l y
free of o p e n , ongoing cluarrels between reporters a n d those w h o hire
them. To be sure, researchers noted that conflicts over resource priorities
a n d turf is a common occurrence within a n d hetween n e w s departments
(Keese 8; Shoemaker, 1971; Tunstall, 1971). Moreover, rese:irchers agreed
that potential for overt conflict within newsrooms over n e w s policies
does exist. Yet they argued that policy fights within neaw-ooms between
reporters a n d editors o r publishcrs were held at bay through compromising (Gans, 1779). trying furtively t o blunt the corners of policy (Breed,
1760; Tunstall, 19711, quitting the organization (Hirschman, 19701, o r s i n ply abiding the policy to k e e p a job (Breed, 1960).
Sigelman (1973) proposed that in many n e w s organizations conflicts
were kept to a minimum through “organizational processes which are
structured to avoid conflict hetwecn reporters a n d their superiors” ( p .
132). He argued that self-selection o f individuals for reportorial positions,
hiring decisions h y editors, a n d the matching o f stories a n d reporters by
the editors w e r e mechanisms that reduced the chance o f clashes between
journalistic superiors a n d subordinates. When h e a n d other researchers
did mention outright attempts b y journalists t o argue openly among themselves a n d with their bosses over policies, they portrayed these incidents
a s unusual-as, for example, in a review o f the way w o m e n journalists
brought coverage o f the women’s movement into The New York Times
(Gans, 1979; Tuchman, 1977).
This idea that overt conflict o v e r policies is unusual a n d temporary in
news organizations has b e e n challenged persuasively in recent academic
writings about news. Following in the footsteps of a much earlier essay
by Stark (1962), researchers have begun t o stress that overt divisions between reporters a n d their superiors over news goals and norms exist continually in many newsrooms along lines o f class, gender., race, a n d ethnicity (Johnson, 1993; Lule, 1992). Comparing the current stress o n conflict
to the many earlier writings that emphasized few obvious tensions, it is
tempting to suggest that part o f the difference in findings is due to the
fact that journalism firms today do actually embody more conflicts than in
earlier decades. O n e reason may be that, a s Hallin (1986) notes, the trend
over the course of the twentieth century has b e e n toward journalists’ increast:d demand for professional autonomy from their firms’ business interests. Another cause may l x that s o m e newsrooms have l x c o m e more
diverse than before, 21s w o m e n a n d , inore slowly, minorities have loecn
entering journalism (Weaver 8; Wilhoit, 1986). As these groups have b e e n
moving into mainstream news firms, they have been forming coalitions t o
change certain policies a n d force the airing of certain views.

31
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At the same time, other contemporary news scholars (Bantz, 1984; Dimmick, 1979) insist that overt conflicts over news goals a n d norms always
have been a nd always will b e at the core o f newswork. Their implication
is that researchers in earlier decades simply were not tuned in o r privy to
the continuing an d widespread nature o f these quarrels. Bantz, for example, sees ;t patterned “culture o f conflict” over resources and policies as
typical o f newswork. Journalists, h e notes, revel in their attachment to a
journalism profession that extends beyond their organization, in k i n g
know n for the pursuit of news values rather than audience ( o r organizational) values. in aggressively exploring stories at the expense of collegiality, a nd in showing concern for news goals at the expense of husiness
goals. He contends that the seeds o f o p en organizational conflict lie in all
these values.
Hantz adds that cooperation is a way that newsworkers attempt intermittently to manage their many conflicts with superiors a n d colleagues s o
that their organization can create its product a n d compete with other organizations. He emphasizes that despite cooperative hehavior newsworkers acknowledge the widespread an d o p e n nature of their organizational
conflict. He states that, whereas such quarreling is not defined as acceptable in many sorts o f organizations, all sorts o f conflict are accepted as a
routine, even a good and necessary, fact o f life in journalism firms. By
which h e means that journalism organizations as a class acknowledge that
interpersonal disagreements about the goals a n d norms o f newswork lie
at the very center o f what it means t o be a journalist.
This contemporary stress o n organizational conflicts a n d their implications has open ed new avenues f o r studying the news process a n d its
products. It raises questions, for example, about the nature a n d formation
o f newsroom coalitions and the role o f disenfranchised groups in the
newsroom. Too, it encourages a reexamination o f popular histories o f
news (Friendly, 1967; Gates, 1078; Keeler, 1990; Robertson, 1992; Sperber, 1986) through a scholarly prism o f conflict as the norm rather than
the exception. Yet just as the academic writings prior to the late 1070s
may have placed t o o great an emphasis o n consensus in the newsroom,
so the contemporary emphasis o n o p e n conflict may obscure important
circumstances in which organizations are afraid to openly acknowledge
tensions and stir u p arguments.

Newswork and Hidden Conflicts
The existence o f such circumstanccs is suggested by a relatively recent
l x i t growing literature o n what have been called hidden conflicts in organizations ( K o l h W Rartunek, 1992). The phrase has been used to describe
frictions in organizations that do not match the formal, rational, a n d collectively recognized dissensions that academic writers have traditionally
addressed. Lately, an increasing numher of researchers have turned their
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attentions to important ongoing conflicts over goals and norms that take
place informally and privately, “in the nooks and crannies o f organizations” ( K o l b & Bartunek, 1992, p. viii). The people involved d o not acknowledge the frictions publicly, often out o f fear that doing so might
threaten their organization’s stability ancl, ultimately, their own professiona 1 situation s.
’The act o f reporting on one’s own organization would seem t o he one
area where conflicts cannot be acknowledged openly. It would seem that
conflict over goals and norms could be tolerated, even celebrated, only
when the essential purpose of the activities is to cover the outside world.
The reason is that the conflict o v e r news values as well as collegial competition can be seen by management and newsworkers alike as contributing individually and collectively to the reputation and profits of the journalist’s own organization. When reporting is turned inward, though,
management and newsworkers alike might sometimes see the costs as far
outweighing the benefits.
They might, f o r example, see certain kinds of reporting on their own
organization as opening the journalism firm t o scrutiny from the outside
world, resulting in a possible loss of prestige and profits. From this point
of view, the journalistic values that encourage organization;rl conflict may
lose their weight. Both management and newsworkers might consider
them selfish concerns that should riot supersede the reporter’s presumed
goal o f long-term health for the news organization ancl its employees. At
the same time, xknowledgment that a news firm considers a topic offlimits might so conflict with the image news organizations want to project
to themselves and others that both parties might share an interest in not
admitting t o themselves o r others that those limits exist.
The way organizations manage such tensions without open discussion
about them is a subject that is o n l y beginning t o get sustained attention.
Strauss (1978) suggests a useful direction b y noting that one way to keep
conflicts from becoming public is by engaging in silent bargains. An example is when an elderly patient makes an implicit agreement with a hospital caretaker t o complain relatively little about pain in return f o r company and friendly relations. Here the caretaker’s conflicting goals o f
compassionate care and rapid work completion meet the patient’s conflicting goals of pain reduction and companionship in a lonely situation.
Both have a vested interest in resolving their internal and interpersonal
conflicts in a way that does not open up the difficulties to painful discussion; the caretaker does not want to admit goals beyond professional aid
and the patient feels that begging for companionship might drive the
would-t>e companion away. In the end, it is the caretaker’s power over
the patient that sets the key terms o f the hidden bargain that holds benefits for both.
As this example suggests, Strauss understands that “power, domination,
and political considerations” guide the amount of argumentation and its
openness in organizations. Silent lxtrgains, he indicates, conie about
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when parties to a conflict over goals o r norms both have a vested interest
in the fiction that nothing has gone awry in the organization or in their relationship. While explicit negotiations do not take place, he says, each
party respects the other’s stakes in the game o f mutual pretense, “but only
up to the limits set by whoever was more powerful in setting those limits”
(p. 254). The result o f this ritual drama of pretense is that the parties to
these hidden conflicts manage the tensions in ways which suit particular
agendas while not making public issues of them.
Strauss’s approach lends interesting insight into the process of managing conflicts that members of organizations tacitly agree must be suppressed. At the same time, a major difficulty of suggesting that Strauss’s
model can be applied directly to understanding the phenomenon of covering oneself is that his notion of silent bargains relies almost exclusively
on dyadic interactions between superior and subordinate members of an
organization to suppress highly charged tensions over norms and goals. It
would seem reasonable to suggest that if organization-wide mechanisms
could be seen that discourage certain types of reporting while keeping
that prohibition beneath the surface, the mechanisms would involve interactions among newsworkers of the same status as well as those in different levels of the hierarchy.
The present study aimed, then, to ask two questions. First, to what extent do mechanisms exist within news organizations to discourage investigations of their own firms and to mute conflicts about the topic? And
second, if such mechanisms d o exist, what are they, how are they diffused, and how d o they influence journalistic behavior and products?

In-Depth Interviews

To begin addressing the questions, this exploratory study focused on
three apparent exceptions: news sources that had published articles
about themselves. As Tuchman (1977) notes, “exceptions enable the observer to perceive and so to examine hidden structures, ideologies, and
powers” (p. 43). For this investigation, one exception was Timemagazine, which had not only carried controversial articles about its parent
firm’s purchase of Warner Communications, but had printed reviews and
articles about movies, books, and other products created by other Time
Warner divisions. The other apparent aberrations were prominent dailies
that had published investigative articles about newsmaking in which the
papers publishing the articles had been discussed.
The journalists who wrote the newspaper pieces were interviewed at
length to determine why and how those pieces were written, the extent
o f deviation from their firms’ norms about covering oneself, and whether
the pieces caused major problems in their wake. At Time Warner, interviews were conducted with two Time writers, one editor, three marketing
executives, and two corporate communication executives. They took
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place during summer 1991, fall 1991, and winter 1992-all within two
years of the merger. The issue o f covering oneself was broached through
questions about the development o f articles in which Time Warner
movies and books were featured prominently. Those interviewed were
asked about an article dealing directly with conflicts o f interests by magazine reviewers (including those at Time). They were also questioned concerning their knowledge of self-coverage conflicts that had been swirling
in the trade and popular press.
The interviews averaged ahout an hour, with the longest one taking
about an hour and a half. All ten of the people interviewed preferred to
hold their names confidential. In fact, the two newspaper journalists
spoke only on the condition that neither they, their newspaper, nor their
articles would be mentioned. Both emphasized that very few articles of
the sort they wrote are published in mainstream newspapers and that
speaking about them even without providing their names would reveal
who they are.

K n o w i n g W h e n Stories Are Off-Limits

The unanimous concern for confidentiality was a measure of the sensitivity of this topic in the news organizations studied. Four journalists in the
group agreed that the prickly organizational tensions they were discussing would be difficult to share publicly. Journalists in their firms, they
believed, understand that their editors consider some types of stories offlimits.
In general, the four respondents contended that trying to get editorial
permission f o r tough investigative reports about the goings-on in one’s
organization, o r one’s parent organization, would be near-futile. It would
be just as difficult to get permission to cover organization-advertiser business relationships. As the journalists understood it, the reason was simple: The stories might result in embarrassing revelations that could clisturb financial relationships and so cut off important sources of revenue.
The comments o f the two newspaper journalists set the stage for explaining the dynamics of this situation. Both maintained that while topics
such as these may be part o f the gossip mill, newsworkers would not propose them to editors as serious story ideas. They said that for some reporters-those who cover heats that have nothing to do with the gossipthe stated reason may be that the issue has nothing to d o with their jobs.
But underlying everyone’s approach to such stories, they contended, was
fear. One fear was that the need to balance concerns about the news with
worries about their job security and their firm’s viability might make any
work on such a subject inadequate. Another fear was that such a submission would brand the author as a troublemaker o r as naive about how the
world works. As one o f the journalists noted, “reporters are concerned
about their livelihood.”

35

/ournal of Cornmunicatron Spring 1994

The reporters indicated there was some discussion laterally in the organizations, that is, among reporters, about goings-on in the firm that might
be grist for their periodicals. They admitted, though, that journalists d o
not argue with each other about the importance of covering those topics.
But despite the fact that lateral gossip is not uncommon within various organizational levels, on a vertical ba
(between reporters and the editors
above them) it is rare. Those interviewed suspected that both reporters
and writers feel uncomfortable talking about such things with their superiors.
Their remarks suggest that neither silent bargains with superiors nor explicit discussions with one another were the immediate cause of the general awareness by reporters of what not to talk about with whom. Rather,
their assimilation of these notions seemed to take place through the
learning of what might be called silent routines. As the name implies,
silent routines are hard to notice because they involve an absence of organizational discussion. Journalists make attributions that their colleagues
are averse even to talking about self-coverage by noting that it rarely
comes up as a topic of serious discussion within the news organization.
The perceived validity of these attributions is reinforced when they see
little, if any, self-coverage in the paper itself. The collective attributions,
in turn, reinforce patterns of behaviors and expectations (habits) that lead
workers to avoid broaching subjects in situations they believe are inappropriate and will get them in trouble. Thus the sensitive problem of figuring out how to investigate parts of their own company becomes a nonissue without much discussion.

The Exceptions, the Rules, and Silent Bargains
Yet while the journalists suggested that silent routines carried the burden
of keeping self-coverage and its tensions muted, their discussions of how

the exceptions came about revealed that silent bargains between superiors and subordinates did play an important role in establishing norms of
self-coverage. They contended that editors wanted them to see their selfcoverage story as a painful exception to typical journalistic duties.
The experience helped reporters understand how far they could go
with exceptions. It also served to reinforce their sense that such coverage
was generally a bad idea, because it placed their status as popular and
savvy members of their organizations at risk. The silent bargain, initiated
by the editors, was that withdrawal from this kind of reportage and future
silence about it would reestablish the status implied in their previous
give-and-take relationships with superiors at the papers.
To understand where the two journalists got these ideas, consider first
their interpretations of why the pieces covering their firms were accepted
and what that told them about the rules of self-coverage. Some of what
they said about getting their stories into print recalls findings by Breed
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(19601, Gans (19791, Koshco (19751, Tuchman (1979), Tunstall (1971) and
others that reporters with special expertise can sometimes get away with
transgressing newspaper policy. Yet there is an additional element here:
even while exulting in the success o f getting their ideas o u t , the reporters
clearly revealed their inference from editors that movement away from
self-coverage would be necessary t o make all their professional lives easier.
A key reason their superiors accepted their stories, they said, was that
the articles were not primarily about their own firms. One reporter said
he had pitched the idea to his editors as hard news that related to newspapers generally. The other had a related topic suggested t o him, but then
broadened it t o include issues that touched on his own organization.
In both cases the journalists said they made it clear to their liosses from
the start that the examination o f their organization was only to be a small
portion o f the piece; only a few paragraphs o f very long articles were devoted t o material about their own firms. Moreover, as if t o show that they
did not feel guilty investigating their firms, both reporters said they suspected from the start that the problems they were exposing around the
country hardly existed in their own papers. Much to their relief, this was
confirmed in their research on their own organizations. Both werc:
vague as to what they would have done had their investigations found
differently.
Another reason superiors allowed the stories, according to the journalists, was because those who suggested them had longtime heats. Both
contended that even though their controversial proposals were not related directly to their heats (and in one case was far removed from it), their
solid reputations inside and outside the papers led their editors to believe
they would write responsibly, that is, in a way that would not embarrass
the firm. One reporter’s remarks, though, made his bosses sound especially defensive. He sensed his editors felt that because his beat was at
least marginally related to the topic, and because he generally had final
control over what he said on his beat, they could disavow primary responsibility f o r running the article if it caused major problems with the
publisher or corporate owners.
Still, both newspaper journalists made it clear that a s the story progressed, tensions that worked against its publication were ultimately
eased by invocations o f journalistic integrity by one o r more editors.
Those editors said they knew firsthand that the problems they were discussing exist in papers throughout the country. They insisted to their
more cautious counterparts that the topic was newsworthy, and they
called forth journalistic values and tradition o f the paper in arguing that
the article ought to be published. As one of the respondents said, ‘.lJltimately, the news imperative-to allow writers to document stories well
and stand by those stories-won out.”
The invocation of journalistic values did not sweep away the problem
of self-coverage in a general sense, though. Despite the appearance of
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their articles, and even though they were pleased with the placement and
length of the pieces, the journalists said they knew their superiors did not
welcome more of the same. Their answers indicate, in fact, that at the
same time the journalists and editors were working to bring the articles
into print, both parties were dropping subtle and not-so-subtle cues that
after publication it would be useful to restore the undiscussed patterns of
behavior, the silent routines, that had deterred them from covering their
own organization.
The journalists said their editors were quite aware that there were other
reporters in the firm whose beats were the most appropriate for covering
those stories. One of the reporters noted that in his case the beat reporter
could have claimed jurisdiction over the topic but did not. To him, and to
the other journalist, the lack of comment from the beat reporters signaled
what they already knew: Subjects relating to the business of newspapers
that touch on their firms’ inner workings are too sensitive to pitch on a
In discussing their attitudes toward pushing the stories through, both
journalists used phrases indicating that these were special cases that took
more than their usual effort. One, referring to his reputation and experience, said, “The bottom line is they might lose a guy like me if they don’t
run the story.”The other similarly said that his stature allowed him, an
“800-pound gorilla” among reporters in the firm, to imply to his bosses,
“This is important. I’m going to the mat on this.” Both reporters were
quite aware, however, that “going to the mat” and implicitly threatening
to leave are acts that must be done rarely to have their desired effect.
In the case of one of the reporters, the cue to restore the silent routines
if he were to retain his organizational status was virtually explicit. He had
a particularly difficult time moving his idea from submission to final acceptance. He asserted that while investigative pieces normally take a long
time at his paper because a number of editors go over them quite carefully, this one took a good deal longer than was typical. Moreover, he said,
the piece fostered more than the usual conflict among the editors as well
as between them and him. He recalled that at one point an editor told him,
“You’renot going to win any popularity contests writing up stories like
this.” Although still interested in exploring the subject, he admitted that he
was discounting his newspaper as the intended outlet and instead was
hoping to share his ideas with academic and other specialized audiences.

Major Conflict at Time
These two newspaper reporters’ experiences in covering their own organizations are examples o f the way journalistic exceptions are both allowed as a result of explicit negotiation and cordoned off as unusual
through silent bargains. The situation at Time can also be understood
through the lenses of hidden conflict, silent routines, and silent bargains.

38

Hidden Conflicts

The Time case, though, is an example o f what happens when major organizational traumas cause silent routines and silent bargains to break
down.
Those interviewed described an approach t o self-coverage before
Time’s union with Warner that was similar to the one confronting the
newspaper journalists. Like the newspaper journalists, and for similar reasons, the two Time magazine writers and one editor mrho were interviewed described ;I traditional tendency toward not proposing coverage
o f their own firm to management. At the same time, their comments consistently suggested that a kind of silent bargain had existed with management that had allowed organizational pride to operate despite such selfcensorship.
That bargain was the implicit assurance that, as long as journalists understood that writing a bout their own organization in the magazine was a
bold move not t o tie carried out o r even suggested lightly, the firm would
back their coverage o f such a sensitive subject. The people interviewed
seemed to have inferred this bargain from their company’s long-proclaimed separation o f “Church”(its editorial side) frorn “State”(its business side). First proclaimed b y Time’s founder Henry Luce ( w h o ironically supervised tioth areas of his company) and backed up by the putative
power of the firm’s editor-in-chief at the corporate level, proclamation of
7ime’s separation of Church and State became a powerful way to encourage loyalty to the magazine on the part of employees and the public at
large (Ciabattari, 1989).
I t was, in fact, the credibility of this Church-State rhetoric that was
questioned openly within the magazine firm as Time’s union with Warner
took place. S o , too, the norms that discouraged Time staffers from openly
pitching investigative stories about their own firm became subject to intense evaluation. Part of the reason was public scrutiny. In the popular
and trade press, the union of Time and Warner set off an explosion of
speculation about whether combining the journalistic giant with the entertainment giant would wreak havoc on Time’s supposed Church and
State norms.
Rumors circulated in The New Yorker magazine and elsewhere that
Jason McManus, Time Inc. editor-in-chief, had intervened to shape his
flagship magazine’s coverage of the merger in ways that benefitted the
new corporation, not journalism (Bruck, 1990). These suspicions were
followed by allegations in a book a h u t “the end of Time” (written by former Time executive Clurman [1992]>that McManus had forced his editors
to sign a promise that they would not write unfavorable things about their
company. Such disclosures fueled speculations as to how the Time Warner combination would affect the way the review sections o f Time, People, and Entertainment Weekly would consider Warner Brothers films,
Warner books, and Warner records (Ciabattari, 1989).
This study’s interviews suggest that inside the company’s magazine division, other problems loomed :it least as large as the aforementioned
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speculations. Cost reductions to help reduce merger debt instigated layoffs and buyouts of many of the magazine firm’s workers. The attrition
left the survivors feeling insecure and questioning the new firm’s commitment to its periodicals. From a strictly monetary standpoint, there was
reason to be concerned. Before Time’s union with Warner, the division
had brought in about 40% of Time Inc.’s revenues. In the huge new corporation, the magazines’ contribution to revenues was proportionately
smaller, about 20%, and the general magazine business was in a recession.
Recognizing their loss of centrality to the firm, the marketing heads of
what was now the Time Inc. Magazines unit of Time Warner came up
with a new strategy for keeping the periodicals a key part of corporate
thinking. They realized that Warner’s film, music, and book divisions all
relied on consumers, not advertisers, to support their products. That provided a wedge for the periodical’s contribution t o the conglomerate. The
magazine executives decided to exploit the fact that their division was the
chief source of advertising revenues in Time Warner. They believed that
magazines could be made credihle to the conglomerate’s chief planners if
they could be used as magnets to attract support from international corporations for several units of the firm. In the spirit of synergy that chairman Steve Ross was heralding, the magazines’ salespeople would catalyze deals with advertisers to buy space across the magazines while they
used Warner records, books, TV shows, and even movies as promotional
vehicles or premiums. In this way, magazines would serve as a major new
platform on which the entertainment and promotion possibilities of the
new conglomerate could be realized (Cappo, Danzig, & Donaton, 1990;
Donaton, 1990; Donaton & Winters, 1990; Sarafin, 1990; Turow, 1992).

Trying to Reset Norms
In view of the reduction of editorial personnel and the repositioning of
the magazine unit t o fit the entertainment-and-promotion approach of the
new firm, Time Warner’s commitment t o separating its business from journalistic norms was questioned inside the company as well as outside it.
What was happening was goal conflict o f major proportions, with potentially costly implications f o r Time’s public image and its organizational
cohesiveness. Comments by those interviewed and public remarks by editors suggest that Time’s leaders tried to manage the disharmony in two
ways: (1) by proclaiming that certain kinds of self-coverage are acceptable, even desirable, no matter how unfavorable the tone; and (2) by encouraging plausible arguments within the firm about why such self-coverage would not necessarily be tainted by conflict of interest.
The first tack, defining certain kinds of self-coverage as desirable, was
obviously important for a magazine with back-of-the-book reviews of
movies, sound recordings, books, TV shows, and other facets of popular
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culture in which Time Warner was a major player. Th’ose interviewed state d that the magazine’s to p management had publicly assured full autonomy within departments for the selection o f products a n d the tone of reviews. They were aware, too, that since the merger, the magazine h a d not
shied away from covering the discord at its parent company, including
the ouster o f co-chairman Nick Nicholas. Particularly startling in this regard was a respectful review o f Clurman’s To the End ?/‘Time that detailed
power struggles within the firm before an d even after the merger (Manning, 1992). In general, those interviewed said, Time management’s puhlic message t o employees an d readers through such writings w a s that a
harrier doe s indeed exist l x t w e e n the editorial a n d business sides o f the
company.
Linked t o this rehabilitation o f the Church-and-State proclamation was
a n argument that seems t o have caught o n within the firm about why
7ime magazine’s reviews o f Time Warner movies, books, a n d records
would remain free from management’s interference. Reviews w e re the
most common place where Time writers’ journalistic sensibility could
conflict with company interests. In interviews for this study. o n e writer
a nd both o f the corporate communication executives gave the same explanation a s to why the company had to k e e p reviewing procedures honest. They contended it would harm the magazine’s revenues in the long
run if the reviewing process was tainted, because readers would stop
trusting the magazine.
To this claim that self-interest would encourage Time Warner’s sufferance of Time’s journalistic values, the writer offered a curious amendment. He remarked that Time Warner management may allow its niagazines to exercise journalistic norms in reviews because, in the end.,
management d o es not consider the magazines’ opinions about Time
Warner products o r their competitors’ products all that influential:
Time Warrzer is a iwvy big compan.y. It ouins eveyything. So everything is
a conjict qf interest. That is to say, (f we were to wrirre something negatiue about O I W oy’ourproducts, <fu)e u w e to write something positive
about one qf our competitor’sproducts, either of those could be taken as
hurting the comnpaTz-y.Rut thepcople who run it understand that uie ’re
trying to be.journali.sts, and they may also realize that we have very little impact.

Whether o r not this startling suggestion has a basis in fact is not the
point here. Rather, the statement should be s e e n as an’other argument o f fered to make the firm’s n e w Church-State proclamation credible. From
discussions with the people at Time, it seems that in conjunction with the
editors’ publicat ion of seemingly bold articles (such a s the Clurman book
review a nd the apparently frank coverage of the Nick IVicholas ouster)
the Church-State proclamation w:is functioning t o move the firm away
from the dangers to organizational stability posed by the public goal con-
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flicts. By showing an d telling o n e another as well as the public that Time
Warner has n o designs o n Time’s decisions to highlight the conglomerate’s products, management an d employees seemed to be trying t o dampe n the conflicts that had b een threatening their status, their firm, a n d their
jobs.

N e w Silent Routines

Those interviewed agreed that management’s assurances about the n e w
Church-State division were not fully persuasive. T w o of the writers volunteered that their reading o f the magazine showed them that Time
would not be honest in covering its parent. O n e of them, w h o was leaving the firm, specifically linked Ted Turner’s being named 1991 Man of
The Year by Timeto relationships with the parent company (Time, 1992).
At the time, about 30% o f Turner Broadcasting System was o w n e d by
Time Warner. Time Warner’s annual reports and marketing executives had
be e n making it clear that they consider their equity in the Cable News
Network (CNN), WTBS, an d Turner’s other holdings a s allowing them to
work jointly an d strategically with that firm. Calling Turner Man of the
Year might, then, be considered a n advertisement for a Time Warner affiliate. Turner’s appearance o n the cover was accompanied by a long story
celebrating his firm’s past, present, an d future. At the same time, his connection t o Time Warner was never mentioned in the story.
Both writers d rew a similar interpretation regarding another conflict of
interest: Time’s cover story o n author Scott Turow a n d his hit books Pres u m e d Innocent an d Burden q f P r m f (Time, 1990; Gray, 1990). During
the week that Warner Books was releasing Presumed Innocent in paperback a nd a few months before Warner Brothers would release the film
version of the narrative, Timedrew up a cover story o n the author that
trumpeted both the book an d film-but did not mention the Time Warner
link. In interviews, people involved with the story insisted that they chose
it on its merits, that they did not g o out of their way to use their journalistic vehicle t o hype Warner’s entertainment products. They insisted they
had the right to review an d highlight pieces that were created by their
parent firm. But they gave inconsistent a n d somewhat puzzling answers
about why mentions of Warner Books an d Warner Brothers did not s h o w
u p in the cover story. O n e writer contended somewhat improbably that
h e often pays n o attention to the name o f the company that distributes
the movies h e reviews.
The same staffers w h o denied being influenced by Time Warner’s relationship with Scott Turow were, however, quite prepared to believe that
some of their colleagues might be influenced. Even wh e n those interviewed did not point to particular examples of tainted self-coverage, they
acknowledged that it might be happening. All of the Time respondents,
including the marketing an d corporate communication executives, specu-
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lated that some editors and writers might well be interpreting signals from
management or articles in the magazine as meaning they would be quietly rewarded for writing certain reviews o r stories in ways that could benefit Time Warner. Three o f those interviewed were even more specific.
They voiced a suspicion that in Time Warner’s new environment editors
and writers were going beyond their traditional fear of investigating the
firm. They might, the employees argued, quietly-without telling anyone-be arranging their writing in response to key Time Warner publicity
needs with the hope of later rewards from management. Only one respondent, a writer, admitted that he might do that hirnself in the future.
I3ut the link hetween silent bargains, silent routines, and self-censorship
in coverage of Time Warner was quite clear in the comments of all of
them.

Assessing the Dynamics of Silence

Focusing on journalists’ approaches to covering their own organizations,
the present study argues the need to modify contemporary scholarly contentions that news firms are accustomed to open conflict between reporters and superiors as a way to work out policy issues. It does not challenge the implication by Bantz (1984),Johnson (19931, Lule (19921, and
others that research of earlier decades tended to underplay policy-related
conflict in newsrooms. I t suggests, instead, that there exist particular
types of circumstances where journalists’ fears for their jobs combine
with their superiors’ fear of extreme organizational instability to lead both
parties to avoid, suppress, and otherwise manage conflict in complex
ways.
The study suggests that a useful framework for exploring such conflict
management comes from sociological work on hidden conflicts in organizations and their relationship to silent bargains. Guided by theoretical
constructs from these areas, the study tracks some o f the tensions that
shape an organization’s self-coverage, maps some of the boundaries o f
that activity, and speculates on how the process might influence what
gets o u t as news and reviews. The findings suggest that the dynamics o f
conflict about self-coverage are even more complex than the silent-bargain notion of conflict management would imply. Silent bargains were
found in superior-subordinate relations, but they were buttressed fundamentally hy silent routines that served to keep the subject o f self-coverage generally quiescent among writers and reporters without direct managerial involvement.
The exploration of self-coverage at 7imemagazine in the wake o f its
parent’s purchase o f Warner serves as a particularly illuminating case. It
suggests what happens when silent bargains and silent routines that keep
the subject quiet are severed by events that raise hidden conflict to public
debate and virtually force self-coverage. Interviews indicate Time Warner
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management explicitly encouraged their magazine personnel to cover the
firm in a detached, journalistic manner. At the same time, however, Time
personnel saw contradictions between those encouragements and the articles their magazine printed. They inferred from the inconsistencies that
management had instituted a new silent bargain with others in the magazine’s staff, a bargain in which staff adopted silent routines in exchange
for status and organizational stability. They had reason to believe that
covertly-in the silent routines which journalists pretend to one another
d o not exist-a reward system about self-coverage was taking root that
stressed caution and loyalty along with the increased frequency of organizational self-coverage.
The people interviewed at Time Warner denied that they themselves
had gone against journalistic values in their writings or directives. Still,
they were quick to add their belief that tensions regarding self-coverage
which accompanied the merger had led many of their colleagues t o
strategically and quietly sidestep the firm’s own journalistic norms to protect their organizational status. Even if they were wrong about their colleagues, these and other comments acknowledged a basic reorientation
of perceptions about their company and its members. A t the very least,
their remarks indicate that the conflicts over self-coverage engendered
underground suspicions that devalued the credibility of the news periodical in the eyes of the very people who were creating it. That in itself may
be a first step toward refraining from writing about certain items or writing about them in certain ways.
More research is needed to discover whether the dynamics suggested
by this exploratory study can be noted in other merger and non-merger
situations. Quantitative studies linking different kinds of mergers t o
changes in the norms of newsworkers, as well as in the amount and nature of self-coverage by journalistic outlets involved in the mergers,
would also be useful. Quantifying evidence of such shifts is likely to be
difficult, however, because trends are likely to be seen over a long period
and because connections with the periodical or its parent firm are often
not indicated in the articles.
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